"bomber gap" controversy was put to rest by 1957. Photographic intelligence on Soviet bomber production collected by high-flying U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft revealed that the Soviets were not rapidly building a fleet of long-range bombers; in fact, because of accelerated B-52 production the United States actually held the lead.65 The "bomber gap" crisis
faded away, but a new one arose. On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik satellite into orbit, causing a shock in the United States that made the "bomber gap" sensation seem trivial. Sputnik,
the Soviet missile test program, and Moscow's boasting about their missile prowess created fears in the United States that the Soviets had gained a significant lead in fielding long-range missiles. This supposed
"missile gap" became the primary concern in U.S. defense planning as well as in the American political arena.
By 1965, improvements in Air Force shore-based air surveillance radars, in conjunction with accurate and reassuring intelligence on the Soviet
bomber threat, had eliminated the need for an active Navy role in continental air defense. The Navy moved quickly to dismantle the extensive force structure it had assembled to carry out the mission. VF(AW) 3
had already been decommissioned, in 1963. On 15 April 1965, USS Newell (DER 322) commenced the last radar picket patrol on the Pacific Barrier, and on 1 May its crew marked the disestablishment of the barrier in
a ceremony at Midway Island. The Atlantic and Pacific Contiguous Barriers were shut down on 30 June 1965. COMBARFORLANT stood down, and the GIUK Barrier was disestablished on 1 September 1965. With no mission to
perform, COMAEWINGLANT, COMAEWINGPAC, and the Navy's last three shore-based airborne early warning squadrons (VW 11, VW 13, and AEWBARRONPAC) were decommissioned in 1965. The last COMNAVFORCONAD closed up shop
in Colorado on 1 September 1965, ending the Navy's formal role in the joint continental air defense mission.66
With the cancellation of the Contiguous Barriers in June 1965, the AGRs were no longer needed; RADRONs 1 and 2 were disestablished in August. The
Guardian-class AGRs were all decommissioned in 1965 and placed in mothballs in the Atlantic and Pacific National Defense Reserve Fleets. They remained in mothballs until sold for scrap in the early 1970s.67
At the beginning of 1965, nineteen DERs remained in commission: six in Newport patrolling the GIUK Barrier, nine in Pearl Harbor for the Pacific
Barrier, one in Guam patrolling the Marianas Islands, and two in Seattle and one in San Francisco serving as training ships. As the barrier patrol mission was winding down, a new mission was arising for these
ships—Operation MARKET TIME was launched on 11 March 1965 to interdict North Vietnamese arms shipments through the South China Sea. DERs were perfect for MARKET TIME, due to their economy, tremendous
endurance, and small size; in the spring of 1965, Vance became the first DER to make a MARKET TIME patrol.68
The Impact of the Barriers
The importance and necessity of the radar barriers have been questioned. Even while commanding BARFORLANT, Admiral Hyland believed that the barrier
patrols were unnecessary and ate up resources needed for other missions.69 On the other hand, the barriers, which denied the option of a surprise nuclear bomber strike on the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, had to
be included in Soviet strategic calculations. Soviet electronic intelligence collection ships (AGIs) were in the North Atlantic monitoring the ships and aircraft on the Atlantic and GIUK Barriers;70 the Pacific
Barrier was also probed by AGIs. The Soviet high command was therefore well aware that the U.S. Navy had erected a radar barrier across the oceanic approaches to North America.
A look at Soviet strategic nuclear forces in October 1962 shows the impact that the barriers had on Soviet strategic calculations. During the Cuban
missile crisis—arguably the closest the United States and the Soviet Union ever came to nuclear war—the Soviet missile force capable of reaching the United States consisted of some forty-four to
seventy-five intercontinental ballistic missiles (of which Russian sources now state only twenty were fully operational), about a hundred submarine-launched ballistic missiles (none of them deployed within
firing range of the United States), and forty-two medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba (for which, Russian records indicate, only twenty nuclear warheads had been delivered to Cuba). The Soviets thus had a
total of only forty fully operational nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching the United States. In contrast, the Soviet Union possessed about 155 long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons
against the United States.71 The Soviet high command, however, knew that its bombers—over three-quarters of its ready strategic nuclear force—could not reach the United States by any route without
being detected by U.S. early warning radars and intercepted by air defense forces. That knowledge undoubtedly reinforced the deterrent effect of American nuclear superiority, strengthening President John F.
Kennedy's hand against Nikita Khrushchev's bluster and bluffs.
We Have Been There Before
Navy participation in the continental air defense mission is a striking example of joint operations. To it the Navy could contribute
state-of-the-art radar picket ships and airborne early warning aircraft, as well as significant air defense experience. Some Navy forces were placed under Air Force control, like VF(AW) 3 and units assigned to
the Contiguous Barriers. Navy forces patrolling the Atlantic and Pacific Barriers remained under Navy control but were integrated into the Air Force air surveillance reporting network. For eleven years the Navy
maintained a vigilant watch over the seaward approaches to the United States as part of the joint air defense team.
The Navy's experience with continental air defense offers lessons worth keeping in mind as the prospect of another homeland defense mission looms on
the horizon: sea-based national missile defense (NMD). As was the case in the 1950s, when technology originally developed to meet fleet-defense requirements proved valuable for defending the nation, the Navy's
ballistic missile defense program could well provide a foundation for Navy participation in national missile defense. The debate on whether to deploy NMD and on whether NMD deployment should include a sea-based
component has focused on threats, technological feasibility, and the desirability of continued adherence to the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, but there are additional considerations as well.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Navy was never enthusiastic about the continental air defense mission, which it viewed as diverting scarce resources
from its primary missions of sea control and power projection. The Navy's strategic concept today may not exclude a homeland defense mission, but it certainly does not accord one high priority. Resource
constraints are at least as severe today as they were forty years ago, if not worse, making it likely that NMD would divert funds and forces from other Navy missions—or at least be perceived as doing so.
Unlike the 1950s, when the Navy had a fleet of economical vessels in mothballs that it could reactivate for the continental air defense mission, modern sea-based NMD would require our most modern and capable
surface combatants. Putting those ships in picket stations off the coasts to perform a single, static mission would not be taking advantage of their mobility and robust, multimission capabilities—which
could be badly needed off the shore of a rogue nation abroad.
Theater missile defense (TMD) capabilities also could be problematic in this regard, due to the possibility that TMD-capable combatants would be
designated as theater commander-in-chief or even national assets, in which capacity their movements and employment would be dictated by higher authority rather than by the battle group commander—as
sometimes happens with Tomahawk-capable combatants today. If the Navy is assigned the NMD mission, so be it. But as we contemplate the prospect of a new homeland defense mission, let us remember that we have
been there before, and we did not like it—for reasons that still apply today.
1. David A. Anderson, "Pictures Reveal Reds' New 'Sunday Punch,'" Aviation Week, 15 February 1954, pp. 12–3.
2. "Congress Gets Red Plane Facts," Aviation Week, 22 February 1954, pp. 13–4; Katherine Johnsen, "Twining Warns of Red Jet Striking Power,"
Aviation Week, 22 March 1954, p. 10; Robert Hotz, "Russian Jet Airpower Gains Fast on U.S.," Aviation Week, 23 May 1955, pp. 12–5; "Aviation Week Story Spurs Debate on U.S., Red Airpower Positions,"
Aviation Week, 30 May 1955, pp. 13–4; and Claude Witz, "USAF Recognizes Red Gains, Spurs B-52," Aviation Week, 6 June 1955, pp. 12–3. Also see John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 38–45; and George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 121–3.
3. Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1987), pp. 32–90; James Meikle Eglin, Air
Defense in the Nuclear Age (New York: Garland, 1988), pp. 60–4, 70–5; and Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., Strategy,
Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 420–1.
4. Jockel, pp. 90–110; and Eglin, pp. 165–8.
5. John Monsarrat, Angel on the Yardarm: The Beginnings of Fleet Radar Defense and the Kamikaze Threat (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,
1985), pp. 156–8; Norman Friedman, Naval Radar (Greenwich, U.K.: Conway Maritime Press, 1981), pp. 99–100, 228–9; and Scott A. Thompson, B-17 in Blue (Elk Grove, Calif.: Aero Vintage Books,
1993), pp. 1–7.
6. Thompson, pp. 5–15; Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft since 1911 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1990), p. 79; "Strangest Shape in the Sky," Naval Aviation News, May 1958, p. 9; and Harold S. Durfee [LCdr., USN (Ret.)], a PB-1W pilot in VX 4 (1947–49), a WV-2 patrol plane commander in VW 11
(1959–61), and Director of Training in the AEW Training Unit Atlantic (1961–63), letter to author, 5 November 1992.
7. Thompson, pp. 15–25; Swanborough and Bowers, pp. 79, 299–300; "Strangest Shape in the Sky," p. 9; and Durfee, letter to author.
8. Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 229; Naval Historical Center,
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships [hereafter DANFS], vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), p. 64; Swanborough and Bowers, pp. 79, 299; and Durfee, letter to author.
9. John J. Hyland [Adm., USN (Ret.)], "Barrier Patrol," Naval History, Fall 1989, p. 58.
10. Commander Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "History, Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, 1 July–31 December 1957"
[hereafter COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History], n.d., Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., p., 4; and Hyland, pp. 58–9.
11. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History, pp. 2–5; Hyland, pp. 58–9; and Eglin, pp. 139, 142.
12. Commander Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "Command History, 1 July 1960–1 January 1961," March 1961, Operational Archives,
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
13. The first COMNAVFORCONAD was Rear Admiral Albert K. Morehouse. Dr. Thomas Fuller, U.S. Air Force Space Command historian, conversation with
author, 14 January 1992.
14. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History; George VandeWater, F4D pilot assigned to VF(AW) 3 in 1961–63, letters to author, 6 September 1992 and 30
October 1992; Robert L. Lawson, The History of US Naval Air Power (New York: Military Press, 1985), pp. 132–3; Carson M. Smith, "They Put the Pinch on Bogeys," Naval Aviation News, April 1959, pp.
22–3; Larry Booda, "U.S. Watches for Possible Cuban IRBMs," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 October 1962, p. 20; "Pentagon Civil-Military Friction Increases," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 15
October 1962, p. 26; "U.S. Moves Jets near Cuba," (Charleston, S.C.) News and Courier, 19 October 1962, p. 3; and Fuller, conversation with author. 15. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History.
16. Station 12 was east of Cape Cod; Station 14 was east of Atlantic City, New Jersey; Station 16 east of Chincoteague Inlet, Maryland; Station 18
east of the Virginia–North Carolina border; and Station 20 east of Cape Lookout, North Carolina. Ibid.; Commander, Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "Command History, 1 July 1959–31
December 1959" [hereafter COMNAVFORCONAD 1959 History], 29 February 1960, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; Commander Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "Command
History, 1 January 1961–1 July 1961" [hereafter COMNAVFORCONAD 1961 History], 11 September 1961, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
17. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History; Commander Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "Command History, 1 January 1960–1 July 1960"
[hereafter COMNAVFORCONAD 1960 History], 3 September 1960, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; and Swanborough and Bowers, pp. 299–301, 580–1.
18. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History.
19. Ibid. DANFS, vol. 4, p. 361; and vol. 6, p. 654. Hyland, pp. 58–9; and Durfee, letter to author, 5 November 1992.
20. COMNAVFORCONAD 1961 History.
21. The station was just north of the Cay Sal Bank, near the Dog Rocks. Ships assigned to the SOUTHERN TIP station would sometimes anchor at the Dog
Rocks in good weather to conserve fuel—and the fishing wasn't bad, either. Ibid.; and DANFS, vol. 5, p. 394.
22. The new COMAEWINGLANT was Captain Leonard E. Harmon. COMNAVFORCONAD 1961 History; Commander Barrier Force Atlantic, "Command History 1
January–31 December 1962" [COMBARFORLANT 1962 History], 11 January 1963, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; "Sitting on Top of the World," Naval Aviation News, August 1962,
pp. 34–5; and Leonard E. Harmon [Capt., USN (Ret.)], COMAEWINGLANT in 1961–62, letter to author, 18 March 1993.
23. COMBARFORLANT 1962 History; Leo P. Zeola [Capt., USNR (Ret.)], WV-2 naval aviation observer (controller) and senior CIC officer in VW 11,
1962–64, tape-recorded oral history provided to author, 8 May 1993; and John J. Coonan [Capt., USN (Ret.)], commanding officer of VW 11 in 1962–63, letter to author, 18 March 1993.
24. Still permanently based at Patuxent River, they took turns making six-month deployments to Argentia for barrier patrol duties. A third airborne
early warning squadron, VW 13, was commissioned in 1958, and the Navy undertook a permanent shift of VW 11 and VW 13 to Argentia; VW 11 was the first to move, in 1958. VW 15 was decommissioned on 15 April 1961,
because only two airborne early warning squadrons were required to patrol the GIUK Barrier. Commander Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "Command History, 1 January 1965–1 September 1965"
[hereafter COMNAVFORCONAD 1965 History], 23 August 1965, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; Airborne Early Warning Wing Atlantic, "Aviation Historical Summary, 1 October
1961–30 September 1962" [hereafter COMAEWINGLANT 1962 History], 22 October 1962, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; Airborne Early Warning Wing Atlantic, "Aviation Historical
Summary, 1 October 1962–30 September 1963" [hereafter COMAEWINGLANT 1963 History], 9 October 1963, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; "Barrier Gets New Squadron," Naval
Aviation News, July 1958, p. 10; Zeola, recorded oral history, 8 May 1993; Durfee, letter to author; and Coonan, letter to author.
25. "Barrier Gets New Squadron"; Zeola, recorded oral history; Durfee, letter to author; and Coonan, letter to author.
26. COMAEWINGLANT 1962 History; and COMAEWINGLANT 1963 History.
27. Station 1 was west of Gray's Harbor, Washington; Station 3 was west of Newport, Washington; Station 5, west of Crescent City, Oregon; Station 7,
west of Mendocino, California; and Station 9, west of Point Sur, California. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957, 1959, 1961 Histories.
28. COMNAVFORCONAD 1960 History.
29. Rear Admiral Benjamin E. Moore was the first COMBARFORPAC. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History.
30. Ibid.; and DANFS, vol. 7, p. 456.
31. VW 16 had been decommissioned in 1957, its aircraft consolidated in VW 12 and 14. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History; COMNAVFORCONAD 1959 History;
Commander Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command, "Command History, 1 January 1962–30 June 1962," 28 August 1962, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV), "Naval Aeronautical Organization" (Washington, D.C.: Aviation History Branch, Naval Historical Center, annual editions, 1953–1966); and "AEW Guards the Pacific," Naval Aviation
News, August 1958, pp. 12–3.
32. Swanborough and Bowers, pp. 299–301; Samuel L. Morison and John S. Rowe, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 10th ed. (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 176; W. R. Green, "Crew One, Best on the Barrier," Naval Aviation News, March 1963, pp. 22–5; Hyland, p. 58; and Durfee, letter to author.
33. Hyland, pp. 58–9; "Barrier Gets New Squadron," p. 10; Durfee, letter to author; Harmon, letter to author; and Morison and Rowe, p. 176.
34. Hyland, pp. 58–9; "Barrier Gets New Squadron," p. 10; and Durfee, letter to author.
35. Hyland, pp. 58–9; Green, pp. 22–5; Zeola, recorded oral history; and Coonan, letter to author.
36. Coonan, letter to author.
37. Green, pp. 22–5; Hyland, p. 58; Durfee, letter to author; Zeola, recorded oral history; Coonan, letter to author; and John B. Lukasiewicz,
WV-2 radio operator assigned to AEWBARRONPAC in 1959–61, e-mail to author, 29 April 1999.
38. Hyland, p. 58.
40. Captain Leo P. Zeola, senior CIC officer of VW 11 in 1962–64, frequently flew on these check rides, deploying to Keflavik with the crew
being evaluated. Zeola, recorded oral history; COMBARFORLANT 1962 History; and Green, pp. 22–5.
41. Zeola, recorded oral history.
42. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957, 1959 Histories.
43. COMNAVFORCONAD 1959 History; "World's Largest Non-Rigid Airship," Naval Aviation News, August 1959, p. 3; and Swanborough and Bowers, pp.
44. COMNAVFORCONAD 1959 History; Swanborough and Bowers, pp. 580–1; and Lawson, p. 149.
45. Swanborough and Bowers, pp. 198–9; Smith, p. 22; Lawson, p. 132; and VandeWater, letter to author, 30 October 1992. Edward H. Heinemann
(1908–1991) also designed the A-20, B-26, and the Mach-2 Skyrocket.
46. The pilot was Lieutenant George VandeWater. Smith, pp. 22–3; VandeWater, letter to author, 30 October 1992.
47. VandeWater, letter to author, 30 October 1992.
48. VandeWater, letters to author, 6 September 1992 and 30 October 1992; Commander 32d Continental Air Defense Region, radio message, date-time
group 32 CONAD REGION OCAFS 200140Z JAN 62, dated 20 January 1962, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
49. The pilots stood a twenty-four-hour alert and then had thirty-six hours off. Initially four planes were kept on five-minute alert, but this was
later relaxed to two on five-minute alert and two to four on fifteen-minute alert. VF(AW) 3 also flew daily combat air patrols over the Florida Strait along the twenty-fourth parallel, which appeared to be the
northern limit of Cuban MiG patrols. VandeWater (who took great pride in his ability to get from the ready room and start his takeoff roll in less than two minutes) states that he flew twenty-six missions during
the crisis, including four scrambles on unidentified contacts—all four of which turned out to be Air Force B-47s. VF(AW) 3 pilots rarely picked up Cuban MiGs visually or on radar and never had cause to
engage them—although they would have loved to prove their stuff in a dogfight with a MiG. VandeWater recalls, "I had a lot of confidence in the F4D. On the nights we flew along the twenty-fourth parallel
with MiGs on the other side, I was certain that I could shoot them down and I think we could have bested them in a dogfight in the daytime. . . . Of course, we fervently wished for some excuse to cross the line
for a shot at them, since our F4Ds were great-performing little fighters in the subsonic-speed range, fully capable, I believed, of mixing it up with a MiG even in a turning fight." VandeWater, letter to author,
30 October 1992.
50. Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1963–64 (London: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1963),
p. 352; and Friedman, p. 228.
51. Friedman, pp. 229–33, 460–8; Blackman, pp. 353, 357. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 265, 272, 334, 571, 657, 673, 676; vol. 4, pp. 56, 152, 361;
vol. 5, pp. 76, 188, 308, 380; vol. 6, pp. 26, 92, 165, 365, 435, 654, 664; vol. 7, pp. 147, 456; and vol. 8, p. 309.
52. Friedman, pp. 229–33; and Blackman, p. 357.
53. Friedman, pp. 231–2; and Blackman, p. 352.
54. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History; Friedman, pp. 460–8. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 265, 272, 571, 673; vol. 4, pp. 56, 152; vol. 5, p. 76; vol. 6, pp.
26, 365, 654, 664; vol. 7, p. 456; and vol. 8, p. 309.
55. James W. Hayes, Jr. [Capt., USN (Ret.)], commanding officer of USS Roy O. Hale (DER 336), in 1961–63, letter to author, 21 July 1992; Mrs.
Walter B. Frick, widow of Commander Walter B. Frick, USN (Ret.), executive officer of USS Mills (DER 383) in 1961–63, letter to author, 2 November 1992; "The History of the Roy O. Hale as a Radar Ship (DER
336)," USS Roy O. Hale News, Winter 1990–91, p. 3. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 334, 571, 673; vol. 4, p. 361; vol. 5, p. 76; vol. 6, pp. 26, 654, 664; vol. 7, pp. 147, 456; and vol. 8, p. 309.
56. Robert J. Bogle, operations officer of USS Roy O. Hale (DER 336) in 1962, letter to author, 20 April 1992; Everett A. Parke, "The Unique and
Vital DER," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1960, pp. 89–91; DANFS, vol. 3, p. 571; vol. 6, pp. 365, 435; and vol. 8, p. 309.
57. Hyland, p. 59.
58. Hayes, letter to author; Bogle, letter to author; Parke, p. 91; and William G. Schofield, Destroyers: 60 Years (New York: Rand McNally, 1962),
59. Terek held a southwesterly course with Calcaterra in trail and on 4 November, 750 miles east of Bermuda, was observed rigging to refuel a
submarine. Terek and a Soviet Foxtrot-class submarine appeared to be closing for a rendezvous, but the presence of Calcaterra and U.S. Navy ASW forces apparently deterred the submarine from joining. Unable to
carry out her mission, Terek turned back to the northeast and started home. Roy O. Hale relieved Calcaterra on 14 November and trailed Terek from the mid-Atlantic to the northern Norwegian Sea, ensuring that the
Soviet ship did not refuel or reprovision submarines that could have interfered with the American quarantine of Cuba. Commander in Chief Atlantic, "CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis 1962," 29 April
1963, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., pp. 121–4; Frick, letter to author; Hayes, letter to author; Bogle, letter to author; "The History of the Roy O. Hale" p. 3;
Schofield, pp. 175–89; and DANFS, vol. 7, p. 147.
60. USS Hissem (DER 400), "Ship's History, 1962" (Washington, D.C.: Ship's History Division, Ships, Naval Historical Center, 8 January 1963); Donald
L. Lassell [Capt., USN (Ret.)], Commander Destroyer Division 601 and Commander Florida Strait Patrol (CTU 81.6.2) during the Cuban missile crisis, letter to author, 11 May 1988. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 334, 676; vol.
6, p. 92; and vol. 7, p. 147.
61. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History; Thomas Gallagan, "Lonely Vigil of the 'Guardians,'" Sea Classics, December 1992, pp. 10–3, 123; and Blackman,
62. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 178, 444–5, 451; vol. 4, pp. 129, 141; vol. 5, pp. 191, 296, 394; vol. 6, pp. 375, 419, 530; vol. 7, pp. 254, 514; and
vol. 8, p. 157. Gallagan, p. 10.
63. Gallagan, p. 13.
64. COMNAVFORCONAD 1957 History. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 178, 444–5, 451; vol. 4, pp. 129, 141; vol. 5, pp. 191, 296, 394; vol. 6, pp. 374, 419,
530; vol. 7, pp. 254, 514; vol. 8, p. 157. Gallagan, pp. 10–3.
65. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 149–50, 366; Dino A.
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 3–25, 28–37; and Prados, pp. 46–50.
66. Its last commander was Capt. H. D. Mann. COMNAVFORCONAD 1965 History; DANFS, vol. 5, p. 76. Seven Willie Victors were lost while patrolling the
barriers—five in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific—with a total of fifty-nine aircrew killed. Of the WV-2s lost, four crashed ashore (all during takeoff or landing), three at sea. Additionally, a
WV-2 belonging to the AEW Training Unit Atlantic and an R7V (the transport version of the Super Constellation) belonging to VW 11 crashed at NAS Patuxent River while on training flights, with a loss of fourteen
aircrew. Earles McCaul, "The Willie Victor Roster," http://personal.riverusers.com/~elmccaul/memoriam.htm. Considering the arduous conditions
under which the Willie Victors flew, this is a respectable safety record, one that stands as a tribute to the skill and dedication of the aircrews and maintenance crews, and to a plane that could take a lot of
punishment—even though it was a challenge to maintain.
67. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 178, 444, 445, 451; vol. 4, pp. 129, 141; vol. 5, pp. 191, 296, 394; vol. 6, pp. 375, 419, 530; vol. 7, pp. 254, 514; vol. 8,
p. 157. Gallagan, pp. 10–3.
68. Over the course of 1965, a major relocation of DERs took place. Two of the six in Newport went to the Pacific Fleet, and CORTRON 16 was
disestablished. In the Pacific, three DERs were decommissioned, leaving twelve: eight at Pearl Harbor, three at Guam, and one at San Francisco. The DERs became a valuable asset in the Vietnam War, but they were
growing old; the remaining twelve were laid up between 1968 and 1973. Jack Sweetman, American Naval History, 2d ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 243–4; Ross Wright [Capt., USN
(Ret.)], commanding officer of USS Vance (DER 387) in 1963–65, letter to author, 3 November 1994; Friedman, pp. 233, 460–8. DANFS, vol. 3, pp. 273, 334, 673, 676; vol. 4, p. 152; vol. 5, p. 76; vol.
6, p. 365; vol. 7, p. 456; and vol. 8, p. 309.
69. Hyland, pp. 58–9.
70. Zeola, recorded oral history.
71. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Farrar, Strauss and
Giroux, 1990), p. 328; and Brugioni, pp. 254–5.
Captain Bouchard is Deputy Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control and Director for Defense Policy on the staff of the National Security
Council. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he holds a master's degree in national security affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and a doctorate in political science from
Stanford University. He has served in USS Lockwood (FF 1064), USS O'Brien (DD 975), USS Paul F. Foster (DD 964), as well as on the Destroyer Squadron 21 staff, and he has commanded USS
Oldendorf (DD 972). Ashore, he has been Special Assistant and Deputy Executive Assistant to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and to Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and has been
Branch Head, Strategy and Concepts Branch (N513), on the Navy Staff. There he was the principal drafter of the 1997 "Navy Operational Concept." He is the author of Command in Crisis: Four Case
Studies (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991), and he is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute Board of Directors.
Naval War College Review, Summer 1999, Vol. LII, No.3